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A common challenge security analysts face, is in making decisions on risk when facing uncertain conditions
especially when risk management procedures are inapplicable. Though analysts may have experience
and their intuition to depend upon, these have sometimes proven to be insufficient and it has also been
identified that risk and uncertainty may be magnified by personal, system and environmental factors. Risk
decision making is an integral part of security analysis, a role facilitated by system automation and design.
However, designing for usable security has not sufficiently considered the implications of design to risk
based decision making and more so in relation to security analysts. The research aims to address this by
coming up with recommendations for design, for risk based decision making.
Information Security, Risk Analysis, User Centered Design, Human Cognition
1. BACKGROUND
Risk is often perceived as a source of fear and
something to be transferred or mitigated as quickly
as possible. Designing for security and usability
means considering risk as early as possible and
providing assurance that different design options are
understood by the users and provide confidence that
certain risks are being addressed.
Traditionally, risk management has followed sets
of predefined procedures that weigh risk response
alternatives and aim at identifying the most suitable
option. However, actual risk analysis rarely follows
such structural and well-defined procedures as
decision makers encounter uncertainties resulting
from unforeseen and evolving conditions. Decision
makers, therefore, result in addressing these
conditions based on their knowledge and intuition
(Klein, 2011). Concerns are raised as research
has shown that decision making is not always
a rational process, a problem magnified by the
lack of guiding procedures, and even experts have
shortcomings that contribute to erroneous choice
(Fischhoff, 1979). To illustrate, the identification of
false positives from vulnerability scanners comes
with experience and the contextual understanding of
events in a system environment. However, systems
that could amalgamate disparate data sources
and present interfaces for contextual analysis
(e.g. identifying a firewall protecting vulnerable
applications), could ease false positive identification,
improve decision making and reduce experience
requirements.
To identify how risk based decision making may
be improved through design; we investigate the
activities of security analysts as an exemplar of
decision makers due to the tangible and visible
constraints they encounter. Security analysts over-
see systems security infrastructures by enforcing
and maintaining security goals. Their role is crucial
in areas where automation cannot fully be applied
and human intervention is necessary (human in the
loop). While human assistance is a prerequisite, it
is the mutual relationship achieved through human-
computer interaction that elevates awareness and
decision making. Failure in risk decision making by
those charged with enforcing security may pose a
great risk as it would violate security objectives and
could be difficult to detect. For example, Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) use is synonymous with attackers
(Werlinger et al., 2010). But does the presence of
IRC on a network signify an attack? What information
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
Proceedings of . . .
Designing Systems for Risk Based Decision Making
•
should be made available to validate this and enable
rapid and effective responses?
Requirements to facilitate risk decision making have
mostly been proposed as secondary contribution
to research on usability requirements from system-
centric (Yee, 2002, Smetters and Grinter, 2002)
and user-centric positions (Zurko and Simon, 1996,
Wixon et al., 1990). System-centricity focuses on
the evaluation of systems requirements in regards to
usability and interfaces, while user-centricity focuses
on eliciting user requirements using techniques such
as contextual design and cognitive task analysis to
improve system and interface design.
Examples of work at the early stages of design
on requirements and decision making has sought
to understand the influence of analogies to design
(Hassard, 2011), the procedures taken for security
requirements prioritisation (Butler, 2003), and the
identification of techniques for making security
requirements relatable to the business (Coles-Kemp
and Overill, 2007). However, the factors to be taken
into account, to facilitate risk based decision making
have not really been considered.
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND AIMS
2.1. Objective
The objective of this research is to identify what
system design principles should be taken into
account to facilitate decision making during risk and
uncertainty.
With an aim of understanding decision making from
a socio-technical perspective, we divide the research
objective into the following three aims:
• To identify the factors that contribute to risk
perceptions held by cyber security risk based
decision makers.
• To identify the factors that promote or constrain
decision making on risk by cyber security risk
based decision makers.
• To devise techniques used to elicit, specify
and validate requirements for systems with
cyber security risk based decision makers as
stakeholders.
2.2. Thesis
The thesis is a framework for integrating system-
centric and user-centric requirements to design
systems for risk based decision making.
3. KEY LITERATURE
The literature review will be based on three areas
pertinent to risk based decision making in security.
These are; security and risk, human cognition, and
system design. To better understand the analyst’s
activities leading to decision making, we will consider
the literature addressing them in security.
3.1. Security and risk
Security is synonymous with risk. This, therefore,
implies that research on security typically addresses
risk, though not always stated. Additionally, risk is
perceived differently at personal and organisational
levels (Adams, 1995, Schneier, 2008). Understand-
ing the techniques analysts use to make decisions
on risk is a step towards understanding how to
design for them. Li et al. (2010) surveyed the han-
dling of uncertainty and risk management in cyber
security. They highlight that risk and uncertainty
are products of internal and external factors. They
illustrate this by classifying risk uncertainty as static
- originating from flaws in system design or as
dynamic - the product of external and dynamic real-
time events, such as attacks.
Focussing on the internal design or static aspect of
risk, others have investigated techniques analysts
use to specify requirements. For example, Butler
and Fischbeck (2002) argue that conventional risk
assessment techniques are inadequate in directing
which security requirements should be implemented
when resources are limited. They propose a frame-
work for quantitatively prioritising requirements. Hi-
bshi (2015) investigates how security analysts use
their experience to come up with security require-
ments, while Hassard et al. (2009) investigates the
persistence of analogies in decision making during
design.
The body of work on the external or dynamic aspects
of risk and uncertainty has covered areas such as;
Awareness (Paul and Whitley, 2013, Botta et al.,
2011), Security Tools (Botta et al., 2007, Xiao et al.,
2014), and Security Operations (D’Amico et al.,
2005, Werlinger et al., 2010).
Although analyst’s decision making has widely been
researched from an internal and external risk and
uncertainty point of view, there has been little focus
on how the analysts may be aided in risk decision
making through design recommendations.
3.2. Human cognition
Work on human cognition plays a vital part in
research on decision making as it explains the logic
behind choice. Risk is a probabilistic subject and the
assumption has been that decisions are made by
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Figure 1: Methodology
carefully weighing alternatives. However, research
on human cognition has shown that the weighing of
alternatives may sometimes be prone to cognitive
errors (Fischhoff, 1979), or decisions may be
made intuitively without weighing alternatives (Klein,
1993). As it pertains to the analysts, the reasoning
behind prompt reactions to certain risks over similar
ones may be investigated and understood through
cognitive analysis techniques.
Central to the notion of cognitive error in deci-
sion making are heuristics and biases (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973). Heuristics are mental shortcuts
people subconsciously make when faced with uncer-
tainty and time limitations. These shortcuts are used
to quickly validate perceived assumptions by match-
ing the limited available data against known facts.
However, factors such as inaccurate perception lead
to inaccurate heuristics and therefore, incorrect de-
cisions. The constant reliance on incorrect heuristics
leads to what are known as biases (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). Due to the lab based nature of
research on heuristics and biases, questions have
been raised about their validity and applicability to
real-world settings (Gigerenzer, 1991).
3.3. System design
As alluded to in section 1, designing for security and
usability means considering risk as early as possible
and providing assurance that different design options
are understood by the users. To relate this to security
analysts and decision making on risks, it entails
considering the implications of security requirements
at design and ensuring proposed models and
designs are understandable and correspond to user
mental models (Norman, 1983). Mental models are
defined as mental representations of domains of
understanding that support reasoning and prediction
(Gentner, 2001). However, usability still raises the
question of whether systems should be designed
to match the user’s mental models, be simplistic to
ease understanding or place the responsibility of
learning on the user (Carroll et al., 1987).
User-centered security addresses this situation
and is described by Zurko and Simon (1996)
as security models, mechanisms, systems, and
software that have usability as a primary motivation
or goal. Zurko and Simon proposed three methods
to achieving usable security, namely; applying
usability techniques to secure systems, developing
security mechanisms for user-friendly systems, and
considering user needs as a primary motivator when
considering security requirements at the start of
system development. The latter being the most
appropriate, in this case.
Considering users at design also implies identifying
techniques adequately capable of eliciting and spec-
ifying these requirements. Though there are various
elicitation techniques complementing conventional
interviews such as; Contextual Design (Wixon et al.,
1990), Critical Decision Method (Klein et al., 1989),
Cognitive Work Analysis (Rasmussen, 1986) and
specification techniques such as; Problem Frames
(Jackson, 2001), UML (Miles and Hamilton, 2006).
The essence lies in identifying techniques that do
not only focus on testing existing systems, but that
are also workable before system implementation.
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND
APPROACH
From a theoretical perspective, the research aims
to follow a qualitative interpretivist approach (Crotty,
1998, Gray, 2013). At a lower level, this will first be
an inductive Grounded Theory approach aimed at
understanding the problem domain, and an Action
Research approach, aimed at formulating solutions
to identified problems. These approaches avoid
proposing a hypothesis early in the research but
allow it to be generated from empirical evidence.
We propose these approaches to learn from the
environment and avoid restricting the work by
binding it to an early hypothesis. Figure 1 illustrates
the detailed methodological approach.
In respect to the three aims, the research will follow
the following phases.
In the first phase, literature will be reviewed covering
the three main literature areas highlighted in section
3. Based on the findings, factors that contribute
to awareness and the perception of risk will be
identified and modelled in accordance to their
interrelation in a socio-technical environment.
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In the second phase, interviews will be carried
out with security analysts to identify the steps
analysts take in risk analysis, the factors that
promote decision making during risk analysis and
the constraints that inhibit it. Grounded Theory
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008) will then be used for
data analysis and Distributed Cognition (Hollan et al.,
2000) for modelling the relationships between the
analysts and artefacts used in decision making. At
this point, the literature based findings from phase
one will also be validated by the empirical data.
Based on the findings and lessons learned from
the first two phases, elicitation and specification
techniques for design to facilitate risk based decision
making will be devised in the third phase. This will
involve contextually analysing user understanding
and objectives during risk based decision making
through the use of Goal-Directed Design (Cooper
et al., 2014), where techniques such as; Personas,
Scenarios (Cooper, 2004) and goal models (Yu,
2011) will be used. To ease the application and use
of the formulated techniques, tool support will be
designed in the form of prototypes or integration will
be made with frameworks such as IRIS (Faily, 2011)
that support contextual design.
To validate the techniques, they will be applied
to a minimum of three case studies using Action
Research, a five-step methodology (1.Diagnosing
2.Action planning 3.Action Taking 4.Evaluating
5.Specifying Learning) that applies interventions to
diagnosed problem situations (Baskerville, 1999).
Where systems have been implemented, the
objective will be to validate the techniques in
comparison with the existing system. Where systems
have not been implemented, the objective will be to
elicit and specify requirements. Feedback, validation
and modifications will be considered as part of the
Evaluation and Specifying Learning phases of Action
Research. The case studies will aim at validating
both the prototype and the formulated techniques.
5. INITIAL RESULTS
Having conducted ten interviews with security ana-
lysts from three different organisations, we identified
areas from a system perspective (Automation and
Interface Design), and areas from the user per-
spective (Mental Models, Heuristics and Biases) that
contribute to risk perceptions. We also identified that
central to the perception of risk is Context. We have
defined the followings as the elements of Context
in risk based decision making: Intelligence, Environ-
ment, Correlation and State. These are illustrated in
figure 2 and elaborated in M’manga et al. (2017)
We also identified that the factors that aid the
analysts in risk analysis and decision making are
Communication, Awareness, Individuals Capabilities
(experience and training) and System Capabilities
(ease of use and analytical abilities). Lastly, we
identified that the main constraints to decision
making by security analysts are conflicts in
objectives originating from goal conflicts. For
example, an organisation may establish a policy
that all communications with external parties should
be encrypted. However, a goal conflict arises when
there is a need to communicate with an external
party lacking encryption capabilities.
Figure 2: Context model
6. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
As an overall, the research aims to provide a
framework to better enable design for risk based
decision making.
The research will also contribute to tool support
through prototyping and the integration with existing
usable security frameworks such as IRIS.
Lastly, the research will provide common ground for
the analysis and understanding of decision makers,
and insight into their operations of security analysts
through case studies and interview data.
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